It’s the kind that links up with your cellphone allowing you to see realtime aerial video within a 500 meter radius, while controlling its flight using your touchscreen.
“Flying toy drones in the classroom tonight are we, sir?” Miss Ursula Bahaghari asked curiously.
“No, Miss Ursula, we’re not. This is my parking attendant,” I answered, “and trust me, this thing is NOT a toy.”
I could see the look of bewilderment on their faces, so I indulged my Omega section of clueless law juniors in a little tech savvy.
“I used to circle the block numerous times looking for parking. Now I just wait on idle in some corner, let out this drone and locate a spot from the air,” I explained, “cut my gas bill in half, believe me.”
“Wow, sir!” said Miss Pinky Maglia Rosa, “I don’t know too many 59-year old law professors doing that!”
“Wonders never cease,” I said, “and why not? Maybe I can fly this thing around the classroom as Miss Ursula suggested. Certainly makes checking attendance a lot easier.”
I set down my briefcase—and drone—on the table and sat down, then lightly tapped the blackboard to call the meeting to order.
“I assigned you people to read up on cyberlibel. Did you download the list of cases to digest that I posted on my wall?”
“Yes, sir,” they chorused.
“Although I listed 26 cases, I really meant for you guys to pay particular attention to the Tulfo and Macasaet cases. I hope you got my hint,” I said.
“Those two cases were set in 14-point Arial Black boldfaced italics and underlined font, sir. They were pretty hard to miss,” Mr. Roberto Sigalot said.
“Was it that obvious?” I feigned surprise.
“Not really, sir. We thought the fact that the rest of the cases were set in 10-point normal font must have been inadvertent!” Miss Ursula reciprocated my sarcasm.
“Well, having read those cases, can you think of a question that might be too unfair for me to ask during recitation—” I haven’t even finished my sentence and everybody jumped me.
“ ‘What are the FACTS of the case’!!!” they all shouted.
“Hahaha…! That’s right. Don’t worry, I don’t intend to ask that question. That case is too jampacked with facts, this is only a one-hour class, we don’t have time. Who is the ‘ponente’ of that decision, Miss Pinky?”
“Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, sir. He was the one who wrote the consolidated decision for both cases.” Miss Maglia Rosa answered.
“And from what we’ve learned from all other ‘ponencias’ of Justice Leonen, what can we expect, Mister Sigalot?”
“Sir, all decisions written by Justice Leonen always incorporate a rich historical research, and this case was no exception. He traced the history of libel jurisprudence right back to the Spanish colonial era, showing the parallel development in the growing harshness of libel penalties, alongside a broadening standard for tolerance and protection from libel persecution against journalists,” Roberto recited.
“That’s the beauty of having a justice who is both an exceptional lawyer and a hard-working researcher and eloquent writer all at the same time. I don’t mind saying proudly here that Justice Leonen is a genuine Baguio boy,” I said.
“Wasn’t he your news editor when you were editor-in-chief of the ‘Gold Ore’ during the 80s and 90s, sir?” Miss Ursula queried. Evidently, this girl had done some research, too.
“No, that was his younger brother, Mike Leonen,” I corrected.
“But you and the good justice are contemporaries, right?”
“No, my contemporary in high school was his other brother, Dr. Marlon Leonen,” I said.
“Oh, so you and the doctor both went to Baguio City High School, sir?” Miss Ursula tried to improve her research.
“No, all the Leonen brothers went to SLU Boys High which my parents couldn’t afford to send me to,” I said, “but we spent those years joining the same citiwide interschool competitions—science quizzes, spelling bees, essay-writing contests and such.”
“ How did you both do, sir?”
“As far as I remember, I always came in SECOND,” I admitted, “but we’re not here to discuss the good justice’s family tree. We’re here to talk about how he straightened out our understanding of privileged communication as the main defense in libel for REAL journalists.”
These two cases I assigned talk about the famous columnist Ramon Tulfo and his publisher over a series of articles they published, exposing a powerful “fixer” at the Bureau of Customs.
Long story short, Tulfo was convicted by the RTC, whose decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals, then reversed by the Supreme Court.
“Mister Sigalot, to save us some time, will you just give a general characterization of the Tulfo articles.”
“There were 14 articles in all, sir and they were vicious and ugly. Reading them makes you so angry at the abuse, and the part where Mr. Tulfo described that extramarital affair between the smuggler and the daughter of former vice-president Lau—”
“Never mind that part,” I interrupted, “I’m only interested in how the Supreme Court clarified our understanding of privileged communication. Let’s start with what you said, the writings were ‘vicious and ugly’ continue…”
“Yes, sir. According to the decision, when a journalist’s writing is vicious and ugly, it’s often because he is DESCRIBING something that is vicious and ugly. So libel has little to do with the published content and more with the intent in publishing them.”
“And what is the journalist’s intent in publishing ANYTHING, Robert?”
“It is presumed his intent is to inform the public, sir.”
“Yes, but isn’t that the intent of every chismosa also?” I twitted my student a bit.
“Yes, sir, but there’s a crucial difference. The journalist does it as a function of his role in society and he does it as a matter of privilege not granted to all chismosos and chismosas.”
“Why is this privilege granted to journalists and not to every other ‘marites’--I hope you know what ‘marites’ means,” I followed up.
“ ‘Marites’ is the gossipers code for ‘mare, anong latest?’ sir,” Roberto said, sending his classmates chuckling.
“That’s not in the Leonen ponencia, is it?”
“No, sir. What is in the decision is the important point made by Justice Leonen that without journalists maintaining a perpetual watch on the words and actions of people affecting public interest, the public would be blind and eventually lose their perception of what those interests are.”
“That’s good, Roberto, you may sit down Where’s Miss Mona Lee So…?”
“Present, sir!”
“Pick up from where Mr. Sigalot left off. Why would something that may be libelous for a ‘marites’ be tolerable for a journalist? If you are slandered, doesn’t the hurt FEEL exactly the same, whoever caused it?”
“Yes, sir. But if you are a victim of libel claiming injury, you are invoking redress for a right that is based on common decency—that’s natural law which is universal and undefined. When a journalist has to protect himself from reprisal for doing his job, he invokes constitutional protection. That is positive jural law, which is enjoyable by a targeted community carrying out a particular function for the good of society—the media “
“Bah! Those spoiled brats!” I said sarcastically, “why should only THEY be given that protection?”
“That’s precisely the reason why it’s called ‘Privileged Communication’ sir.”
“You know that decision contains an element often overlooked by judges and prosecutors these days, regarding the common perception about statements made by public officers. Did you notice that, Miss Mona Lee So?”
“Yes, sir. The common understanding is that it is not libelous if you quote remarks made by public officers on a matter of public interest.”
“Why is that noteworthy in this case?” I asked.
“Sir, because Mister Tulfo did not invoke that as a defense, but he was acquitted just the same without using that defense. In fact he could not.”
“Why not??” I asked.
“Eh kasi sir, the customs fixer was not a public officer. He was a private individual, just like the daughter of Vice President Laurel…”
I banged the backboard too late and my class broke out in guffaws, “kasasabi ko lang huwag nang banggjtin eh…!”
“Ay, sorry, sir! Nadulas—”
“Never mind!!” I said, “so what’s the implication of that on the traditional defense of ‘fair report of a public pronouncement not libelous’?” I scowled.
“Sir, it means the meaning of ‘public pronouncement’ is centered on whether the pronouncement is of PUBLIC INTEREST and not so much on whether the person making the pronouncement is a PUBLIC OFFICER or ordinary civilian.”
“Otherwise? If we don’t make that distinction, what happens?” I asked.
“Sir, it would create a class of persons who could never be libeled—PUBLIC PERSONALITIES—and if they could never be libeled, then nobody can commit libel against them---”
“And?”
“And that, in turn, would erase the distinction between people whose writings are covered by privilege communication from those who are NOT.
“Did you get that, class?” I began to wrap up the lesson. “You done good, Miss Mona Lee So, you may sit down. Where’s Mister Oskar Cannell?”
“Present, sir!”
“Oskie, you have the same surname as my favorite Hollywood TV director from the Golden Age of TV in the 80s so don’t let me down,” I chided the Fil-Canadian retiree, “summarize all of this evening’s recitation for your classmates.”
Oskie’s eyes grew even bigger than they already were, and he gave me that look that said, “Why do you pick on me? What did I do wrong??”
After a few moments, he composed himself and said slowly, “When this decision came out, many thought the Supreme Court was being ‘kunsitidor’ to the media. But, in fact, all those accusing Justice Leonen of patronizing the press are dead wrong. Clearly he said even journalists CAN commit libel if they write viciously about something NOT of public interest, because doing so they STEP OUT of the safe bubble that protects them, called privilege communication. It just happens that in this case Tulfo wrote something so ugly about something that was itself UGLY that affects public interest. So now it becomes simpler to determine if something is NOT libelous: it treats of PUBLIC INTEREST, tackled by someone who enjoys PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION.*
“Wonderful, Oskie….CLASS DISMISSED.”*
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